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AbstrAct
Languishing labor market conditions throughout Latin America, along with pull factors in countries 
such as the United States, point to continued and increased skilled migration from Latin America. The 
outflow of well-educated Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Peruvians, Venezuelans, Brazilians, and Mexi-
cans in search of better incomes and career opportunities is well noted. Yet, important qualitative 
differences exist in terms of who does —and, important in this context who does not— emigrate and 
why? Drawing on interview data with Mexican professionals in Mexico City, in this article I suggest 
that social network theory is insufficient for understanding skilled migration from Mexico. Focusing 
on those who stay behind, I offer instead a sociocultural framework, one that emphasizes individuals’ 
own discursive renderings and that acknowledges that individuals’ decisions not to migrate are rooted 
in class-based dispositions, cultural beliefs, and social practices.
Key words: Mexico, skilled migration, migration decision-making process, cultural logic, social class.
resumen
El debilitamiento de las condiciones del mercado de trabajo en Latinoamérica, además de los factores de 
atracción en países como Estados Unidos, indican que la migración calificada continuará y se incremen-
tará. El flujo de salida de salvadoreños, guatemaltecos, peruanos, venezolanos, brasileños y mexicanos 
bien preparados en busca de mejores salarios y oportunidades de desarrollo en sus carreras es evidente. 
Aun así, existen importantes diferencias cualitativas en términos de quién —y algo muy importante en 
este contexto, quién no— emigra y por qué. A partir de un trabajo con datos de entrevistas con profe-
sionistas mexicanos en la Ciudad de México, en este artículo se sugiere que la teoría social de redes es 
insuficiente para entender la migración calificada desde México. El enfoque se centra en quienes se 
quedan, y se ofrece, en lugar de un marco sociocultural, uno que enfatiza las perspectivas propias del 
discurso de los individuos y que reconoce que las decisiones individuales de no migrar se encuentran 
enraizadas en situaciones basadas en la clase, las creencias culturales y las prácticas sociales.
Palabras clave: México, migración calificada, proceso de toma de decisiones migratorias, lógica cul-
tural, clase social.
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IntroductIon
Languishing labor market conditions and limitations to the development of research, 
science, and technology in countries throughout Latin America, as well as the pull 
factors present in developed countries, especially in the United States, point to the 
persistence of skilled migration from Latin America (iOm, 2009; Martínez Pizarro, n.d.; 
OeCd-undesa, 2013). According to the International Organization for Migration (iOm) 
(2009), Latin America and the Caribbean is the area of the world with the highest rela-
tive growth of skilled migrants from 1990 to 2007. In the Andean region alone, the 
number of skilled migrants soared 162 percent during this period; Venezuela and 
Peru, in particular, witnessed a significant surge, 216 and 177 percent, respectively.
The increase of skilled migration by region and country can also be appreciated 
by examining migration rates.1 Estimates for 2007 suggest that the emigration rates 
for El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala were 31.6, 31, 25.4, and 25.3 
percent, respectively (iOm, 2009: 20). However, the outflow of well-educated Latin 
Americans in search of better incomes and career opportunities is not confined to 
smaller, poorer, and/or more isolated countries. Indeed, in the Latin American and 
Caribbean context, Mexico contributes a significant share to out-migration. Despite 
its comparatively lower emigration rate (16 percent), Mexico provides the largest 
stock of skilled migrants, mostly to the United States (iOm, 2009: 19). And, nowhere is 
the concern over Mexico’s fuga de cerebros, or “brain drain,” more pronounced than 
inside its very own borders.
The flight of intellectual capital from Mexico has long been publicly expressed 
and debated. Scholars and political pundits generally recognize two waves in the ex-
odus of professionals from Mexico (Aráuz Torres and Wittchen, n.d.). The first spans 
the years 1982 to 1986, a period marked by profound structural adjustments (wide-
spread privatization of state firms, labor market deregulation, and fiscal austerity) 
that not only sent the economy into a free fall but also many middle-class Mexicans to 
the United States, Canada, and Spain (Babb, 2001; Nevaer, 2007). The second pro-
nounced exodus took place during Vicente Fox’s administration (2004–2006), when 
employment opportunities for professionals stagnated (Aráuz Torres and Wittchen, 
n.d.). Focusing on Fox’s last two years in office, Judith Zubieta García, from the unam
Institute for Social Research, worried publicly about the emigration of intellectual
capital, noting that “tens of thousands” of professionals and graduate degree holders 
1  Migration rates indicate the percentage of skilled people from a specific country who reside in a foreign 
country. In other words, when one examines emigration rates, one is essentially asking the question: how 
large or small is the number of outgoing skilled people compared to the number of people with the same 
educational level who remain in their country of origin?
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emigrated from Mexico to places like the United States, Canada, France, and Germa-
ny (Nevaer, 2007). Echoing this concern, Zúñiga and Molina (2008) report that from 
2000 to 2005, the share of new migrants to the U.S. with higher education (which in-
cludes those with bachelor’s, master’s, and professional degrees in areas like law and 
medicine, as well as doctoral degrees) increased from 3.2 to 4.4 percent. In absolute 
numbers, they estimated that this translated into average annual flows (for the 2000-
2005 period) of slightly over 20 000 university-educated individuals.
Little question exists as to the increase in the volume of highly skilled Mexican 
emigrants (Clemens, 2014; Marmolejo, 2009; Zúñiga and Molina, 2008), most of 
whom are destined for the United States. Clemens (2014), who provides a decade-
long view, suggests that between 2000 and 2010, the share of skilled Mexicans in the 
U.S. grew from 8 percent to 19 percent. Still, a number of qualifications with respect 
to such growth are important to highlight, particularly if one is to assess, for in-
stance, the “problem” of brain drain, or the degree to which Mexican professionals, 
as compared to their other Latin American counterparts, emigrate or not. With re-
spect to the former, we might consider that approximately one-fifth of Mexico’s uni-
versity-educated population lives abroad (Clemens, 2014). Clemens  (2014) further 
notes that, although not negligible, this statistic does not constitute a significant 
qualitative shift in skilled migration. In terms of the latter, South American migrants, 
and in particular Peruvians, tend to be more educationally selected (emphasis in the 
original) than Mexican migrants (Takenaka and Pren, 2010: 179). Moreover, emigra-
tion rates indicate that in 1990, 2000, and estimates for 2007, El Salvador and Hondu-
ras, for instance, had significantly higher emigration rates than Mexico (iOm, 2009).2 
More recently, according to OeCd statistics from 2010/2011 (published 2013), the emi-
gration rate of Mexico’s highly educated was 6 percent, compared to 19.6, 17.2, and 
13.8 percent for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, respectively.
This scenario begs an important question. Compared to their South American 
counterparts, what accounts for the significantly lower rate of Mexico’s skilled migra-
tion to the United States? This question, the focus of this article, becomes all the more 
compelling when we consider both the geographical proximity shared by the U.S. 
and Mexico, as well as the long history of migration from Mexico to the U.S. Indeed, 
the assumption is very often that, in a situation of economic hardship and less than 
optimal work or career prospects, Mexicans, and in particular, any Mexican who pos-
sesses the financial, human, and social capital to migrate to the United States will 
2  Small countries provide the highest percentage of skilled labor living abroad. On the contrary, countries 
with the lowest rate of skilled migration tend to be the most populated, such as Brazil, Argentina, Venezue-
la, Peru, and Chile. Mexico is the only exception to the rule: while it is the second most populated country 
in the region, 16 percent of its skilled labor resides abroad, mainly in the U.S. (iOm, 2009).
34 
Carmen Henne-OCHOa
nOrteamériCa
want to or will do so. This assumption is problematic for a number of reasons, one of 
which is our underestimation of the tendency of skilled Mexicans to migrate domesti-
cally. Clemens (2014: 5), for instance, observes that there is no greater tendency for 
Mexican skilled workers to migrate between countries than between Mexican states. 
Moreover, the presumption that any Mexican who possesses the financial, human, 
and social wherewithal to migrate to the U.S. will want to or will do so ignores impor-
tant sociocultural aspects of the migration decision-making process. Borrowing from 
the words of De Jong (2000), it ignores the expectations skilled Mexicans hold about the 
advantages of their home community and the expected (possible) disadvantages of 
the destination community, in this case, the United States.
Here, in examining Mexico’s lower rate of skilled migration to the U.S., I move 
beyond classical frameworks that theorize migration decision-making processes at 
the individual or household level, specifically, what is variously referred to as social 
network theory, chain migration, and cumulative causation (Kandel and Massey, 2002; 
MacDonald and MacDonald, 1974; Massey, 1987; Massey, Durand, and Malone, 
2002; Tilly and Brown, 1967). Instead, I expand upon a sociocultural framework that 
puts a priority on individuals’ own discursive renderings for remaining at home. 
Drawing on interview data, a crucial point I underscore throughout this article is 
that the decision not to emigrate, or what De Jong (2000) calls the stay decision —very 
much like the determination to leave, or the move decision— is, as Cohen and Sirkeci 
(2011) aptly note, an explicit decision. This stay decision, moreover, is one that is fun-
damentally rooted in individuals’ class-based dispositions, their social practices, 
and cultural beliefs.
LIterAture
In Mexico, the flight of intellectual capital is a recurring issue that intermittently dis-
appears and reappears on the public agenda in light of alarming statistics. Tuirán 
(2009), for instance, cites statistics from the Encuesta Continua de Población (Ongoing 
Population Survey) to stress that the most significant relative loss among Mexicans 
involves those who have the highest levels of education. Mexico’s “brain drain,” he 
notes, means that 442 000 Mexicans living in the United States have a bachelor’s de-
gree and approximately 110 000 have a master’s or a doctorate. In addition to those 
with degrees, a stock of 811 000 Mexicans reside in the United States who have some 
university education but have not completed their degrees. In 2007, about 8 percent 
of the seven million Mexicans with advanced degrees lived in the United States 
(Rosenblum et al., 2012). 
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On the one hand, Mexico’s “brain drain” is framed as an alarming issue and as 
detrimental to Mexico’s economic development prospects (Marmolejo, 2009; Ne-
vaer, 2007; Zinser, 2004; Zúñiga and Molina, 2008). In the words of Zúñiga and Mo-
lina, “Mexico’s increasing loss of high-skilled labor creates a vicious circle between 
development and migration….The country is losing bright minds that might otherwise 
have provided innovation and accelerated technological progress in Mexico” (2008: 
17). On the other hand, others see skilled migration not as a zero-sum game where 
the migration of individuals with human capital is framed as wholly or as necessar-
ily a negative process. Clemens (2014: 2), for instance, maintains that skilled labor 
mobility can increase the yield of human capital investments, and moreover, “inter-
acts with the incentives to invest in education in a way that can convert Mexican 
‘brain drain’ into a ‘brain gain’” (see also Boucher, Stark, and Taylor, 2009; McKenzie 
and Rapoport, 2010). Furthermore, Clemens (2014) cautions on the rush to overstate 
skilled migration from Mexico, and in particular, sets out to address the increased 
skill fraction among Mexico-U.S. migrants, said to have increased between 2000 and 
2010 from 8 percent to 19 percent.
Various “intuitive” factors, Clemens (2014) notes, have shaped skilled migration 
flows and patterns. For instance, 29 percent of the growth in the skilled share is ex-
plained by the fact that many of the emigrants arrived in the U.S. as minors and were 
thus educated in the United States, not in Mexico. And in fact, he underscores that the 
rate of growth between 2000 and 2010 diminishes if only the people who arrived to 
the United States after the age of 18 are taken into account. In addition, 28.5 percent 
of the growth is due to the fact that, between 2000 and 2010, the unemployment rate 
grew much more among unskilled Mexicans than among skilled Mexicans. This 
trend, Clemens (2014: 8) maintains, tends to favor skilled migration relative to un-
skilled migration, with this tendency reversing with the stabilization of employment. 
Finally, 10.4 percent of the growth can be attributed to the fact that, as indicated by 
Chiquiar and Salcedo (2013), from 2000 to 2010, investments in education meant that 
the educational level of the Mexican labor force generally grew. Thus, the incentive 
for skilled Mexicans to emigrate is all the more pronounced in a situation in which 
Mexico’s supply of educated individuals is growing almost five times faster than 
overall population growth, but in which domestic opportunities for professionals are 
not keeping up with supply (Zúñiga and Molina, 2008). Taken together, these factors 
explain roughly two-thirds of the presumed growth rate of Mexican skilled migration 
to the United States between 2000 and 2010, and thus, according to Clemens (2014: 8), 
“do nothing to alter the fundamental dynamic that drives skilled migration.”
While some scholars have been preoccupied with the growth of Mexican skilled 
migration, others, including Takenaka and Pren (2010), are concerned with the variation 
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of skilled migration across countries in Latin America. In particular, these authors are 
concerned with the significant difference between the skill levels of Peruvian and 
Mexican emigrants. The relatively high educational level of South American emi-
grants, for example, contrasts starkly with that of Mexican emigrants. According to the 
2000 U.S. Census, 59 percent of persons in the United States who were born in Argen-
tina, 53 percent of those born in Peru, 46 percent who were born in Columbia, and 37 
percent of those born in Ecuador had some college education. Among those in the 
United States who were born in Mexico, only 14 percent had attended college (Take-
naka and Pren, 2010). Furthermore, Peruvian migrants are twice as educated as Mexi-
can migrants (14.8 and 6.2 years, respectively). And, as captured by the higher ratio 
between the schooling of migrants and non-migrants, Peruvians are also more select-
ed [emphasis in the original] than Mexican emigrants (Takenaka and Pren, 2010: 179). 
In light of the above, Takenaka and Pren (2010: 179) question why such an edu-
cational differential exists. While they acknowledge that they “do not fully under-
stand why…there is such a large difference between Peru and Mexico,” in each 
setting, they account for it by focusing on migrants’ social capital. That is, they un-
derstand the presence, development, and nature of migrant networks as crucial for 
determining who leaves and who does not. Takenaka and Pren’s explanation is no 
doubt buttressed by prominent studies of international migration to the U.S., partic-
ularly, Massey’s extensive studies (see for instance, 1987; 1990) and those of Massey 
and colleagues (see Kandel and Massey, 2002; Massey, Durand, and Malone, 2002). 
These studies underscore that while “international migration may originate in the 
structure of sending and receiving societies…once it has begun, it eventually devel-
ops a social infrastructure that enables movement on a mass basis” (Massey, 1987: 
1373). Moreover, Massey maintains that this movement is made possible by virtue of 
possessing what Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 119) call a “durable network of more 
or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” 
Indeed, as Takenaka and Pren (2010: 189) note, Peruvian migrants hail from the 
upwardly mobile middle-class. Peruvian migrants’ high educational levels can be 
explained by their access to and use of relatively recent —albeit well-established— 
social networks that tend to replicate their own educational characteristics. In the 
Mexican context, however, migrants have historically been poor and uneducated. 
Therefore, largely as a consequence of this history, social capital operates to influ-
ence the movement not of educated professionals but of poor, uneducated, and, of-
ten, undocumented migrants. Consequently, Takenaka and Pren (2010) implicitly 
deduce that, comparatively speaking, Mexico’s lower rate of skilled migrants may 
be explained in terms of the absence of such networks that have otherwise histori-
cally helped lower-class Mexicans migrate to and settle in the United States.
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Social capital, the “auspices” of migration (Tilly and Brown, 1967) and “cumula-
tive causation” (Kandel and Massey, 2002), is no doubt central to understanding mi-
gration dynamics. As Takenaka and Pren’s (2010) research suggests, it is particularly 
key to understanding Peruvian professionals’ migration patterns. I propose, how-
ever, that the implicit deduction that suggests that Mexican professionals’ lack of 
social networks might account for Mexico’s comparatively lower rates of skilled mi-
gration, does not wholly account for skilled migration patterns in the Mexican con-
text. It is important to acknowledge, for example, that while skilled migrants may 
not have access to the same kinds of robust family networks that have long been 
available to less-educated Mexicans, professional networks, many of them exten-
sive, have long existed.3 
Additionally, we might consider, for example, various factors that may make 
family/social networks redundant for Mexican professionals. Not unlike other Latin 
American professionals, Mexicans endowed with human capital (skills and edu-
cation) are likely to absorb the high economic and social costs associated with migra-
tion. Not only do Mexican professionals, many of whom migrate to the U.S. with 
H-1B visas (and also, although less frequently, with TN visas), have the financial
wherewithal to seek legal status, but many also have the kind of cultural capital
needed to arrive and adapt to life in the United States. Indeed, given Mexico/U.S.
relations and the two countries’ geographical proximity, many Mexican profession-
als, if not fluent, have at least a moderate command of the English language, and,
moreover, many have direct familiarity with U.S. American culture, traditions,
and practices, often through leisure travel, study abroad, and/or visits to friends and
extended family. One might argue, therefore, that such human and cultural capital
might mitigate Mexican professionals’ need for, or else make redundant, family/so-
cial networks in the U.S.
Certainly, why the vast majority of Mexican professionals choose to remain in 
Mexico rather than emigrate requires both macro- and micro-level understandings 
of (im)mobility. At the macro-level, for example, some scholars cite immigration pol-
icy as a major obstacle for skilled migration from Mexico. Although Mexican profes-
sionals can often absorb the costs of migrating legally, the fact remains that H-1B 
visas are expensive and involve a time-consuming application process. Furthermore, 
since annual quotas limit private sector firms to a specified number of H-1B visas, 
they are in short supply. Orrenius and Streitfeld (2006: 11) note that the H-1B quota 
3  For example, the Mexican Professionals Network in Washington, D.C.; the NYC Latino Professionals net-
work; and, other large and small professional networks that exist throughout the country and that operate 
under the aegis of local and regional Chambers of Commerce.
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of 65 000 was reached well in advance of the end of the 2004, 2005, and 2006 fiscal 
years: “With the backlog of applications growing, the 2007 allocation was exhausted 
in July 2006 before the start of the 2007 fiscal year.” In 2013, even amidst growing 
anti-immigrant sentiment, in an effort to attract highly skilled foreign talent, the U.S. 
Senate approved an immigration reform bill that eliminated “caps on the number of 
green cards available to foreign citizens working in the United States who hold a 
U.S. graduate degree in science and other critical areas” (Velasco, 2013). Still, like 
social network explanations, an immigration policy that restricts Mexican skilled 
migration to the U.S. does not fully or adequately account for the social and cultural 
practices that, in the words of Cohen and Sirkeci (2011: x) “sometimes check migra-
tion patterns.”
In what follows, I highlight Mexicans professionals’ own discursive renderings 
for “staying behind.” In particular, I focus attention on their subjective expectations, 
informed as these are by their class-based dispositions, cultural beliefs, and social 
practices. 
methodoLogy 
The interview data I present here is an extension of two years of ethnographic field-
work I conducted in Mexico City between 2003 and 2005.4 As a follow-up to that re-
search, I conducted interviews with 10 individuals in July 2012 in Mexico City; I also 
present these findings here. Consistent with a qualitative research paradigm, I pur-
posely selected individuals who could illuminate skilled migration decision-making 
processes, given their profiles and experiences as Mexican professionals. Thus, as 
with all qualitative research, the sample was not random and therefore the findings 
are not generalizable. However, this study provides detailed insight into the phe-
nomenon of skilled migration decision-making processes and points the way for 
further inquiry into this area.
I conducted a total of five semi-structured, in-depth interviews (see Appendix - 
Open-ended Interview Guide). Of the five interviews, one was done in a group, with 
the participation of six individuals; and, another was with a married couple that 
participated in a joint interview. With the exception of two people, I knew all other 
participants from my previous ethnographic research. In total, the views and experi-
ences of 10 self-identified Mexican professionals are reported on here. Six interviewees 
4  The ethnographic research I conducted in Mexico City between 2003 and 2005 served as the basis for my 
doctoral dissertation, “Crisis in Foxilandia: Neoliberal Restructuring and the Work Lives of Mexican Profes-
sionals during the Fox Administration (2000-2006).”
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were females aged 24 to 47. The four male interviewees’ ages ranged from 35 to 59. 
All interviewees have a formal educational level above the national average. At the 
time of the interviews, two had medical degrees (mds), with surgical specializations; 
one had a doctorate (PH.d.); two had master’s degrees; and one interviewee was en-
rolled in a master’s degree program, which she had not yet completed. The remain-
ing four had bachelor’s degrees. At the time of the interviews, of the ten interviewees, 
nine were employed in full-time permanent positions.
The interviews lasted between two-and-a-half to three-and-a-half hours and 
were semi-structured and recorded. I relied on an interview guide to cover key 
themes and address essential questions that initially emerged from my larger 2003-
2005 ethnographic project and that examined how Mexican professionals made 
sense of economic and workplace restructuring during Vicente Fox’s historic “ad-
ministration of change.” As part of that research, a key topic revolved around the 
strategies they adopted to cope with job insecurity and instability during a time 
when unemployment was having a disproportionate impact on those with the high-
est level of education. As a coping strategy, at least discursively, migration, especial-
ly to the U.S., was rarely, if ever, an option for the Mexican professionals whom I 
interviewed. Thus, in July 2012, I pursued explicitly and more systematically the 
topic of migration as a (possible) strategy for coping with insecure and unstable em-
ployment and for expanding one’s employment opportunities. Here, I also exam-
ined Mexican professionals’ perceptions of the United States and their attitudes 
toward U.S. Americans. All my interviewees have travelled to the U.S. at one point 
or another, most of them on numerous occasions; and, two interviewees have lived 
and worked in the U.S. for an extended period of time in the past.
To analyze my interview data, I followed a procedure typical of qualitative re-
search. I used Transana, a qualitative data management and analysis software tool. 
My analysis followed an inductive process, whereby particular themes emerged from 
the interview data as I examined it for content and patterns that would shed light on the 
questions guiding my research. I assigned codes (key words and phrases) throughout 
all the transcripts. Then, I re-examined the data associated with each code in order to 
develop a comprehensive understanding of the nature of social practices and cultural 
beliefs identified in the interview transcripts. Finally, I examined associations be-
tween and among codes, determining how they were interrelated in ways that sug-
gested Mexican professionals’ explanations for their (im)mobility.
Skilled migration from Mexico is a complex process. Certainly, the present anal-
ysis is neither meant to generally call into question social network theory nor chal-
lenge macro-level explanations of mobility (for example, pulls and pushes of wage 
and labor markets, or immigration policies). In offering the present analysis, my 
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goal is much more modest:  namely, to encourage further exploration of the local 
meanings of (im)mobility —in particular, from the perspective of the non-movers— 
so as to deepen and broaden our understanding of Mexican skilled migration.5
mexIcAn ProfessIonALs’ (un)emPLoyment PredIcAment
If we focus on the period of Vicente Fox’s administration (2000-2006), acknowledged 
by many to mark the second wave of skilled migration from Mexico, the (un)em-
ployment scenario for Mexican professionals was less than inspiring. In 2004, for in-
stance, 684 000 Mexicans with university degrees were unemployed (inegi, 2004a). 
And, in 2005, people with college and university educations had a 35-percent unem-
ployment rate compared with 11 percent for people who had not completed their pri-
mary education (inegi, 2005). As for wages, in Mexico City in January 2006, professionals 
earned from US$6 to US$15 a day (this includes those working in jobs ranging from 
newspaper reporter to social worker to nurse). Indeed, far from being the beneficia-
ries of job and government program expansions (campaign promises made by the 
once presidential hopeful, Vicente Fox), Mexican professionals were instead coping 
with mounting economic pressures brought about by the downsizing, job losses, and 
low wages that characterized Fox’s administration (Ochoa Álvarez, 2008). Well after 
Fox’s tenure, the (un)employment among Mexican professionals leaves much to be 
desired. In the first, second, and third quarters of 2013, respectively, 149 630, 146 775, 
119 753 people with higher education were unemployed (compared to 30 261, 31 200, 
and 39 566, respectively, of those who had completed primary schooling).
In light of the difficult (un)employment and economic prospects Mexican pro-
fessionals face, why are they not emigrating in significantly larger numbers? As I 
noted earlier, various explanations have been offered, including the high costs of 
skilled migration, given that Mexican professionals are more likely to seek legal sta-
tus in order to practice their professions outside Mexico. Also, as mentioned earlier, 
others such as Takenaka and Pren (2010) have noted the absence of social networks 
for Mexican professionals. These explanations are no doubt worthy of consideration. 
Nonetheless, alone, they mask the ways in which immobility is very often both an 
explicit decision to “stay put” and a critical statement on the part of Mexican professionals 
5  In 2015, I conducted a dozen subsequent intensive open-ended interviews with Mexican professionals, all 
of whom held visas to reside and work in Washington, D.C. In that I conducted these interviews after the 
submission of this article for publication, findings from these interviews are not included here. However, 
they do show some themes that are consistent with the earlier sample and further complicate skilled mi-
grants’ decision-making processes with respect to “staying put” or migrating.
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to undermine their rich and powerful neighbor(s) to the North, all the while “remain-
ing integral” to their definition of national “identity and belonging” (Cohen and 
Sirkeci, 2011: 92). Here then, I maintain that Mexican professionals’ logic of (im)mo-
bility needs to be understood as rooted in certain class-based dispositions, cultural 
beliefs, and social practices. It is to this that we can now turn our attention. 
On Money, Comfort, and the “Middle-Class” Habitus
If someone offered to pay me triple what I make now, I would leave! I have no problem. 
Of course I would take advantage of the triple salary! But, I would stay for a couple of 
years and then I would return [to Mexico]. You can be sure of that! But, I won’t and can’t 
go to the U.S., because the reality is that I cannot make triple there what I now make here. 
I can’t work in the U.S. doing what I do here. – Mariana, cardiac surgeon, Mexico City
The remarks above by Mariana, a surgeon in her mid-30s, gets at the complicat-
ed nature of Mexican professionals’ logic of (im)mobility. On the one hand, she 
weighs the allure of “higher” pay in the U.S., and on the other hand, she is keenly 
aware of the constraints in terms of the transferability of her human capital. Mariana 
is a physician with a specialty in general surgery and a sub-specialty in cardiac surgery. 
In addition, she has a master’s degree in hospital administration. In recent corre-
spondence, she prefaced disclosure of her earnings with the somewhat self-con-
scious request that I “not laugh” at her meager earnings. For the fiscal year 2013, she 
earned US$18 000 (approximately US$1 500 a month) working part time in one of 
Mexico City’s public hospitals where she has been employed for close to 12 years. 
For several years now, to supplement her part-time work she has contracted with a 
private practice as a consultant and surgeon. Such contract work is highly variable 
and dependent on the number of surgeries Mariana is able to schedule. In 2013, her 
gross income from contract work was approximately US$12 000, bringing her total 
earnings to US$30 000 for the year. 
Faring only slightly better than Mariana, Natalia, a surgeon specialized in pedi-
atric cardiology and who earlier had joked that she would leave for the U.S. were she 
offered triple her current salary, earns approximately US$45 000 annually.6 Natalia 
holds a master’s and a doctoral degree in the medical sciences, and, moreover, occu-
pied a competitive fellowship as a resident at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. 
6  The annual incomes I state for both Mariana and Natalia are their net earnings. Moreover, it is important to 
take into account the fact that many physicians in Mexico do not individually pay for or carry liability in-
surance (This is not a question I directly asked Mariana or Natalia and, therefore, I cannot say for sure if 
they do or do not pay for liability insurance.). Thus, while U.S. physicians make significantly more than 
Mexican physicians, they must purchase their own liability insurance and also pay high income taxes.
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As a point of contrast, in 2012 in the U.S., median pay for physicians and surgeons, 
not disaggregated by specialty —the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not track physi-
cian salaries by specialty— was equal to or greater than US$187 200 per year (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, 2012). According to a different source, the American Medical 
Group Association, cardiac and thoracic surgeons, who make substantial salaries 
even at the beginning of their careers (an estimated US$360 000 per year), earn a me-
dian yearly income of US$533 084 (see Decker, n.d.).
Indeed, those whom I interviewed were keenly attuned to the wage differential 
that exists between Mexico and the U.S. It is not lost on them that not only do their 
U.S. counterparts earn substantially more there, but also that Mexican-born profes-
sionals residing there have higher earnings. Zúñiga and Molina (2008: 11) note, “De-
gree-educated individuals in Mexico have an average monthly income that is six to 
seven times lower than that of Mexican-born professionals residing in the United 
States (US$475 and US$2 813, respectively).” It is also the case that skilled Mexicans’ 
professional attainment possibilities, including wages, are significantly lower com-
pared to other immigrant groups (for example, Central American and Canadian im-
migrants) who have professional or graduate degrees (Flores, 2010; Takenaka and 
Pren, 2010; Zúñiga and Molina, 2008). 
Thus, my interviewees’ allure of “higher” earnings in the U.S. was, in reality, 
tempered by their equally keen awareness that their human capital could not be eas-
ily transferred. Indeed, access to a well-paying job in the United States depends not 
only on the possession of human capital but also  on the structural organization of 
U.S. labor markets, including but not limited to credentialing and job availability.7 
The odds of securing a highly skilled job “were somewhat greater in the 1970s than 
in recent decades, though the odds of getting a skilled job have generally been im-
proving” (Flores, 2010: 200). Particularly problematic for Mexican professionals is 
the prospect of underemployment, or what the literature calls “brain waste,” which 
is when individuals take jobs below their educational level, skills, and expertise. In 
2007, 33 percent of all Mexicans in the U.S. with a bachelor’s degree or higher were 
employed in transport/production, construction/maintenance, and cleaning and/
food preparation, the very sectors that provide jobs for 75 percent of less-educated 
Mexican migrants (Zúñiga and Molina, 2008: 10). Thus, those I interviewed recog-
nized that if they were to leave for the U.S., they would face the same employment 
7  More research is needed to delineate, for example, the extent to which the limits in terms of the transferabil-
ity of human capital impacts Mexican professionals’ considerations in deciding to migrate or “stay put.” 
What would it take, for instance, for Mariana and Natalia to practice their medical specializations in the 
U.S.? What visas would they need to apply for, and are such visas widely available or are their numbers 
restricted? 
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constraints there as they currently do in Mexico. In other words, they would likely 
be performing jobs that do not require their level of education. While underemploy-
ment is a coping strategy Mexican professionals often resort to in their own country, 
their narratives suggest that this is something they are little prepared to be subjected 
to or to accept in the United States. 
Expanding this sentiment expressed by Mexican professionals gets at their 
class-based dispositions, thereby highlighting their logic of (im)mobility. Two mat-
ters are important to address here: one, Mexican professionals’ outright rejection of 
gringos’ characterization and treatment —whether real or perceived— of Mexicans 
as second-class citizens; two, Mexican professionals’ recognition of the fact that, 
were they to leave for the United States, their earnings and modest financial cushion 
would not allow them the same standard of living they currently enjoy in Mexico. 
Mexico’s significantly lower cost of living (Orrenius and Streitfeld, 2006: 12) and its 
stark economic and social disparities means that Mexican professionals’ paychecks 
go farther in Mexico than they would in the U.S. Consider a comment made by Na-
talia, the pediatric cardiologist. In a joking tone that sparked laughter from those 
participating in the group interview, she noted that while an offer of double her sal-
ary would not inspire her to leave for the U.S. an offer of triple her salary might per-
suade her. She states,
I am happy in Mexico. I love my country. And, I hate the gringos. But, if the price was 
right, triple what I am earning now, and I am going to have a better quality of life, I could 
leave. But then again, not even this will be [a deciding factor]. No. At this level, it’s not 
likely that one could live that much better in the U.S. than here. 
Following Natalia’s comment, the group erupts in laughter, presumably at the 
foolishness of the idea that one could actually have a superior quality of life in the U.S. 
compared to that currently enjoyed by professionals in Mexico. Take Mariana, for 
instance, who, for most of her adult life has lived in apartment buildings. But not even 
her longing for a patio, garden, or green space would motivate her to leave for the 
United States. She notes, “Even if in the U.S. I could have a house with a garden, I can’t 
throw away what I have now, here in Mexico, as a cardiac surgeon.” Agreeing with 
Mariana, Adrián, who holds an upper mid-level position at Bancomer bank adds, “It 
is true that what we [professionals] earn [in Mexico] allows us to live a pretty com-
fortable life.” In Adrián’s case, this comfortable life includes ownership of a modest 
two-bedroom/one-bathroom apartment, a housekeeper, his paid-off sporty Volkswa-
gen Golf vehicle, membership in a private health club, twice-yearly vacations to Eu-
rope and the U.S., and regular outings to restaurants, dance clubs, and cultural events. 
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The same holds true in Mariana’s case, with the exception that she does not own but 
rather rents her apartment, and owns a new BMW. Among my participants, owner-
ship of a vehicle is no small matter. As both Mariana and Adrián make clear, riding 
the subway, that is, the use of public transportation, is undesirable among many 
Mexican professionals.  
That Mexico’s low cost of living and its stark economic disparities allow Mexi-
can professionals to stretch their paychecks, and thus affords them a comfortable 
living, is exemplified by the kind of life enjoyed by Carla and Bruno, who partici-
pated in the interview jointly. They have been married for 17 years and have one son. 
With a yearly income of approximately US$170 000, they own a lovely, spacious 
three-level house with four bedrooms, three bathrooms, green spaces, and a fully-
finished basement that served as Carla’s textile and art workshop. They purchased 
their home in May 2003 for US$325 000 and it is now currently worth US$500 000. 
More recently, in February 2012, they purchased an apartment in a luxury residential 
building, which they currently rent to a relative, as an investment for their 10-year-
old son. Carla and Bruno own three vehicles: a 2004 Audi, a 2007 Mazda, and a 2010 
Honda. Since their son entered school, he has only attended private institutions. At 
the time of our interview, school tuition for their son consisted of a yearly registra-
tion fee (US$925) and monthly tuition of US$540.
While Carla and Bruno have never hired someone full time to care for their son (in 
large part owing to the fact that Carla only intermittently works part time), they em-
ploy Doña María, their housekeeper/cook, who works for them Monday through Fri-
day for a total of seven hours daily. Carla notes that they pay Doña María on a weekly 
basis. In doing the calculations out loud, Bruno discloses that, on a monthly basis, her 
salary comes out to US$415. Somewhat self-consciously, Carla adds that Doña María 
eats two meals a day at their house while on the job, and that she very often gives her 
“extras.” Bruno echoes this point and adds that often they pay for Doña María’s medi-
cal bills. In addition to Doña María, who has been working for them for close to a dec-
ade, Carla and Bruno employ another woman, who performs specific tasks such as 
ironing, for a total of eight hours a week. They pay her the equivalent of US$160 per 
month. Carla and Bruno also pay a gardener US$40 a month to maintain their lawn 
every three weeks. Indeed, when I inquire from Carla if and how emigration would 
impact their standard of living, she says, with some interjections by Bruno,
Economically, I think our lives would be similar to what we have now. What I do believe 
would change significantly is the help, the logistics of help we currently count on [the 
housekeeping, cooking, ironing, and gardening]. Over there [in the U.S. or Canada], we 
wouldn’t have the help we have here.
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Skeptical of Carla’s conclusion, Bruno interjects that when he lived in Canada 
and in the U.S., there, too, he had the opportunity to live well. He adds, “Although 
all we [referring to his first wife] could afford was a housekeeper who came once or 
twice a week.”
Bruno is all too familiar with the cost of living in Canada and the U.S., where he 
lived from 1979 to 1993. He received his Ph.D. in thermal engineering from the Univer-
sity of Waterloo in Canada, and later had a post-doctoral fellowship in Canada’s De-
partment of Defense. Bruno returned to Mexico in 1994 and for the past 16 years has 
held a high-level engineering position with the federal government. It was in Mexico 
that he married Carla, who for 12 years ran her own silk textile business but which she 
recently closed in order to pursue a master’s degree. Bruno has always harbored a de-
sire to leave Mexico. Despite enjoying a “high” quality of life afforded by their materi-
al comforts, like many other Mexicans, Bruno and Carla are not exempt from the 
hazards of daily living in Mexico City, including, but not limited to, dangerous levels 
of air pollution and daily traffic congestion that some say adds two to three hours of 
travel time to their typical day. Bruno’s daily work schedule and commute often pre-
vent him from returning home before his son goes to bed for the evening. 
Perhaps most difficult for many Mexicans, including Bruno and Carla, is the 
widespread insecurity and the high levels of crime in Mexico City. Indeed, Mexico’s 
levels of kidnappings have shot up “from almost 600 in 2006 to more than 1 300 in 
2011 [and] the number of homicides doubled in that period, to more than 27 000” 
(Velasco, 2013). During the time I was doing ethnographic research in Mexico City 
(2003-2005), I witnessed a tragic moment experienced by Bruno and his family, name-
ly, the kidnapping of a close family friend. This friend was released months later, but 
not without needing prolonged hospitalization and paying a hefty ransom that was, 
in part, negotiated internationally.8 This tragic experience was, for Bruno, Carla, and 
their extended family, a personal and painful reminder of the ways in which insecu-
rity and crime has increasingly made living in Mexico City undesirable.   
The last time Bruno seriously considered emigrating was in 2007, when he con-
sidered moving to the U.S. Carla, however, has not been altogether supportive of the 
idea of migrating in general and of going to the U.S. in particular. She stresses that if 
her family were to emigrate, Europe or Canada, in that order, would be their first 
choice as destinations. 
8  Important to note here is that the man who was kidnapped, upon his release, did not leave for the U.S.; this 
despite his financial wherewithal and despite the pleadings of his extended family, particularly his son, 
who resides in Texas. 
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Carla’s explicit reluctance to emigrate, as well as her migration destination 
choices, warrants further exploration. We should question, for example, the extent to 
which Carla’s unwillingness to emigrate checks Bruno’s own desire —one might 
even say, his decision— to migrate to the U.S. in search of a safer and more secure 
environment and “better” job opportunities. Donato et al. (2010: 11) point out that 
Mexico’s patriarchal family structure is such that migration decisions in Mexico tend 
to be male-centered and hence involve little or no input from women. As a result, 
migration is thus almost always male-led with women following later for purposes 
of family reunification. While this may be the general pattern among poor and work-
ing class Mexican migrants, we cannot assume that it is or would be similarly the 
case for skilled Mexican migrants. Indeed, education, economic status, and class-
based dispositions play a significant role in conditioning individuals’ migratory de-
cisions such that, as in Bruno and Carla’s case, it is important to consider how, for 
middle- and upper-class Mexican (potential) emigrants, keeping the family intact 
takes precedence over potentially better opportunities abroad. From the outset, 
then, family migration, rather than family reunification later, is —or would ideally 
be— the goal for such families.
Carla’s explicit aversion to the idea of migrating to the U.S. and her preference 
for Europe and Canada also warrants further scrutiny. After all, while Bruno and 
Carla do not have relatives in either Europe or Canada, they do, in fact, have rela-
tives who are spread out across and have been established for close to 50 years in the 
United States, particularly in Houston. These are relatives, moreover, with whom 
Bruno and Carla are close and with whom they are in regular contact via telephone. 
One would expect from the research on migrant social networks that the “intuitive” 
destination choice for Bruno and Carla would be the United States. Their strong feel-
ings against such a choice, however, are illuminating. In fact, before I could even finish 
inquiring about the kind of support these relatives would or could offer them were 
they to migrate to the U.S., Bruno, without hesitation, interjects, “No! I wouldn’t even 
consider it!” Carla agrees that asking for help with respect to what she calls “practi-
cal and operative matters” is out of the question.
Despite the fact that I notice discomfort in Bruno’s demeanor and tone regard-
ing seeking help from relatives, I proceed to inquire why they would be more in-
clined to seek the help of friends in Canada than their relatives in Houston with 
whom they have close ties. Bruno is silent for several seconds, somewhat irritated by 
my question, and then responds,
I don’t know. I don’t know. I guess because I imagine that they had their struggle [migra-
ting/moving] in their time and they themselves did it all on their own. I had my own struggle 
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to get to Canada and I did it all on my own. When I went to the United States, I also man-
aged all on my own. I just wouldn’t ask for help. I wouldn’t consider it. My cousins who live 
in the U.S., I mean, for all intents and purposes, they are Americans. I know they are very 
busy with their work. Perhaps, if we asked for help, it would be more about asking them for 
an orientación, that is, helping to orient us…If we were to ask for help, it would have more 
to do with things related to being in a new place, but that’s as far as we would go.
To Bruno’s explanation, Carla adds, “Yes, that’s the kind of help we would ask 
for. But, we wouldn’t depend on them for putting us in contact with a job or poten-
tial work.” To appreciate Bruno and Carla’s reluctance to call on relatives for help 
can be understood in the context of the entrenchment of those middle-class values 
—namely, self-direction, self-discipline, self-initiative, independence, and individu-
alism— that Mexican professionals hold dear to their hearts. Such values —and an 
affront to them, we might imagine— militate against the acceptance and mobiliza-
tion of the kinds of social support that have historically helped poor and working-
class Mexicans migrate, settle, and succeed in the United States.
Both Bruno’s reasons for wanting to leave and Carla’s reasons for wanting to 
stay are varied and complicated. Bruno’s reasons have little to do with job insecurity 
or poor wages. As I noted earlier, he earns approximately US$170 000/year and has 
every assurance that he will continue to work at his current place of employment 
until retirement. Rather, his desire to leave Mexico has to do with his profound disil-
lusionment with the slow pace of political and social change, widespread corrup-
tion, growing levels of violence and insecurity in Mexico, and, most importantly, his 
desire to provide their 10-year-old son with a better and brighter academic future. 
While Carla acknowledges Bruno’s reasons for wanting to leave for the U.S., her 
own reservations have to do with wanting a guaranteed job for Bruno before leav-
ing, as well as with her perceived lack of English fluency.
Perhaps more important, however, is her polite disdain for U.S. culture. This is 
less an anti-U.S.-American stance and more an affirmation of Mexican identity and 
culture, albeit in juxtaposition to U.S. culture. Thus, Carla extols Mexicans’ respect 
for and attachment to family life, as opposed to the excessive individualism she be-
lieves exists among U.S. Americans.9 To this, Lucia, a psychoanalyst who migrated 
9  Mexicans’ distinctly “intense” attachment to family is further compounded by what Mariana (in a separate 
interview) notes is Mexicans’ attachment to place. In a voice that mimicked someone from Monterrey, 
Nuevo León, and which evoked laughter from everyone in the group, Mariana blurted, “This is no joke. As 
if family attachments were not enough, Mexicans have just as strong an attachment to place. [By way of 
example] “¡Los pinches regiomontanos no pueden soportar vivir en el D.F. Luego, luego quieren regresar a 
su estado!” (The goddamn natives of Monterrey can’t stand living in Mexico City. Right away, they want to 
return to their home state.” 
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to Mexico from Columbia over a decade ago, adds, “the kind of lifestyle” that U.S. 
Americans live 
is very strange to the Mexican….Americans work all day and don’t see their family; they 
don’t eat together. In Mexico it’s different. Mexican families eat together every Sunday.
In addition to a strong attachment to family, my interviewees talked at length 
about what Bruno called Mexicans’ focus on “transcendental” activities. He deploys 
this term by way of critiquing what Carla called U.S. Americans’ being content to 
“kill time” and their engagement in superficial activities such as their obsession with 
sports and with renovating their cars and houses. Bruno continues,
[U.S. Americans] have little interest, little genuine interest, in what happens around the 
world. The average American doesn’t seem either very conscious or very concerned with 
what is happening around them. 
Carla chimes in: 
What bothers me is that there is this pure selfishness in the general [U.S. American] popu-
lation. Americans don’t see anything beyond their bellybutton. Americans are not open to 
other cultures, which is very curious because the U.S. is a country whose wealth comes 
from the “openness” toward the immigrant, right?
Unlike Carla’s polite disdain, other Mexican professionals whom I interviewed 
had harsh words for U.S. Americans and U.S. culture. Mariana, for instance, did not 
mince words when she noted that “Americans are uncultured (incultos), belligerent, 
and racists.” Julián, who is in his early 30s, has a bachelor’s degree and has been 
working for close to a decade in a government ministry, reiterates this sentiment, 
saying, “¡Pinches gringos! Son bien incultos” (Goddamn gringos, they’re so uncul-
tured.). On this subject, Natalia, too, is quite vocal. Looking at me somewhat apolo-
getically for what she is about to share, she recounts an experience she had as a 
fellow resident at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. She prefaces what she is 
about to say by stressing that she is the first to admit that all physicians everywhere 
are very myopic in their awareness of what is going on around them, politically and 
socially. And, she admits that in large part this has to do with the fact that they spend 
an inordinate amount of time becoming experts in their medical fields. Natalia then 
admits, 
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We [physicians] don’t take time to read about other things, about a million other things 
that are going on around us. But, but, even with this level of closed-mindedness and lack 
of an expansive education, I can assure you that we [emphasis added] are very aware of 
the economic, political, and cultural situation not only in our own country, but also the 
situation in your [emphasis added, by which she means, the U.S.] country.
She continues with the point of her story, which is worth quoting here at length:
When I arrived to the Mayo Clinic, which as you know is top-notch, I met a Mexican 
physician who is now a very close friend of mine…This physician is a super doctor. She is 
well-known in her field for the kind of research she does…she has a Ph.D. and has been 
widely cited for her research on the arrhythmia gene. When I got to the Mayo Clinic every-
one was talking about this friend of mine. It turns out that when my Mexican physician 
friend got to the Mayo Clinic, she was introduced to all the other big-name physician/
researchers in her field. The American physicians asked my friend where she was from. 
She answered that she was from Mexico. In disbelief, the American physicians repeated 
her answer, “You’re from Mexico? But how can you [emphasis added] be from Mexico, 
and moreover have a doctorate?’ My friend wanted to say to all of those American big-
name physicians, “You pendejos [idiots/assholes], it might benefit you to take a trip to 
Mexico, or get a magazine to educate yourselves. Not all of Mexico is comprised of people 
who didn’t have a chance to get a formal education.” Americans, I tell you, are so utterly 
uneducated and uncultured!
Having recounted this experience, Natalia offers the meaning of such an experi-
ence as the answer that should clearly spell out for me Mexican professionals’ logic 
of immobility, and more specifically, their outright objections to leaving for the U.S. 
Rhetorically, she asks me, 
So, why then would people like me, who have a job here, who, moreover, like what they 
are doing and for which they have spent so much of their lives studying and preparing, 
why would people like me go to the United States? “¿Como por qué?” (For what?) What 
would be the use? What, so that we can put up with all that discrimination and racism?
This indexes Mexican professionals’ concerns with economic, cultural, and so-
cial —what Carla appropriately called habitus— differences between the U.S. and 
Mexico. These differences, however, are not necessarily construed by Mexican pro-
fessionals as a threat to their “distinct” Mexican identity and culture. For, indeed, 
today, Mexican professionals do not see their Mexican-ness, to borrow from Morris 
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(1999: 377), as being “endangered by the food they eat, the clothes they wear, or 
where they keep their money.” Mexican professionals, to be sure, happily celebrate 
U.S.  traditions (Black Friday and Halloween, for example), consume U.S. products, 
vacation in U.S. locations, and attend U.S. universities. In other words, adopting U.S. 
traditions and imitating U.S. consumption patterns, a matter Carla and others devoted 
sustained attention to during our interviews, does not, as Carla and others would agree, 
“make a person any more or less Mexican, or say anything about the nature of their 
national identity” (Morris 1999: 387). Moreover, imitating U.S. Americans’ consump-
tion patterns does not preclude the intense distrust, resentment, and outright hostil-
ity some of those I interviewed harbor toward the United States and its citizens 
(Morris, 1999).10 Such resentment may be understood in terms of asymmetries of 
power. More specifically, in terms of Mexican professionals’ experiences of humilia-
tion and their keen sensitivity to U.S. perceptions —whether real or imagined— of 
Mexico’s and Mexicans’ inferiority (Morris, 1999: 371). As we will see in the next sec-
tion, the humiliation and deprivation that Mexico has suffered historically at the 
hands of the gringos fuels Mexican professionals’ bronca (anger) with and disdain for 
U.S. Americans and their culture, and, moreover, provides the discursive rationale 
for their decision to “stay put.”
Rejecting the Status of the Mexican as Second-Class Citizen 
¡Los mexicanos somos unos chingones, nuestra comida es una chingada,11 y nuestra cul-
tura es súper chingona, y por eso nadie se quiere ir! (We Mexicans are kick-ass; our food 
is kick-ass, and our culture is super-kick-ass; that’s why nobody wants to leave!) – Maria-
na, cardiac surgeon, Mexico City
During the group interview I conducted, cardiac surgeon Mariana proudly pro-
claimed this sentiment, partly in jest and partly out of frustration. It was, in effect, 
her plea to bring our group interview to an end after more than two hours of discus-
sion and her realization that we were not getting closer to a “definitive” perspective 
espoused by Mexican professionals that would seem to explain why they choose to 
remain at home, rather than emigrate under difficult economic and (un)employment 
circumstances. Her statement explains why Mexicans, in Mariana’s view, do not 
emigrate. The noun chingón, from which the words chingones, chingada, and chingona 
10  In the literature, traditional views have tended to link [higher levels of] Latin American nationalism and 
anti-U.S.-American sentiment with the elite and intellectuals (Hollander, 1992: 356).
11  The speaker actually said “nuestra comida es una chingada,” but the context suggests that she may have 
meant to say “una chingonería,” since the first expression is negative and the second is superlatively posi-
tive. And the latter is the meaning taken for the rough translation. [Translator’s Note.]
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derive, is widely accepted as a vulgar term, albeit one that is widely used with vary-
ing connotations.12 In the context in which Mariana uses the expletives, the meaning 
is unequivocal. Mexican professionals, according to Mariana, do not leave their 
country because Mexicans are the very best (unos chingones), because Mexican cui-
sine is out-of-this-world good (una chingada or chingonería), and because Mexican 
culture is qualitatively superior (super chingona). In response to Mariana’s comment, 
Adrián adds, “and we’re not just talking about food, but also about poetry and art.” 
In contrast to Mexico’s rich cultural heritage, the United States, according to Mari-
ana, “has zero cultural history.”
In the moment, Mariana’s biting explanation provoked laughter from the group. 
Yet, her words, more than simply capturing national pride, underscore a more cru-
cial point. Namely, that the intensity in the kind of national pride and cultural iden-
tity expressed in her comment must, at least in part, be understood as emanating 
from —if not in juxtaposition to— her outright rejection of gringos’ characterization 
and treatment of Mexicans as second-class citizens. Indeed, such a juxtaposition is a 
recurring theme in the interviews I conducted. Adrián, for instance, who lived and 
studied for several years in the United States, related an experience he endured in 
the 1990s when he applied for a job there. With disdain in his voice, he noted,
When I was living in the state of Indiana, job applications I filled out asked me to mark 
my race and ethnicity. I remember this very clearly; I have it very clearly documented in 
my head. [He asks rhetorically] I thought that asking about race and ethnicity was illegal? 
The fact that employers inquire about one’s race and ethnicity is unjust. I was asked if I 
was Caucasian, Hispanic… 
Before he could finish his sentence, Mariana interjects, “I’m surprised they didn’t 
ask if you were Amerindian!” At the mention of this, the whole group bursts into 
laughter at the seeming ridiculousness of the category “Hispanic.” Taking the laugh-
ter as his cue to continue on the matter, Adrián stammered, “Hispanic! Hispanic! This 
is racist!” With emphasis and disdain, and drawing on his own personal recollection 
and experience, he imitates U.S. Americans’ pronunciation of the word “Hispanic.” 
¡No, yo no soy Hissspanic! ¡Yo soy mexicano! (No, I’m not Hispanic! I’m Mexican!). For 
Adrián, then, requiring Mexicans to disclose their race and ethnicity on job applica-
tions, and, moreover, categorizing them as “Hispanic,” is outright racist and thus evi-
dence of U.S. Americans’ treatment of Mexicans as second-class citizens.
12  The term “chingar” translates to “fuck”; it is especially and liberally employed by Mexican youth, regard-
less of their social class and/or educational level.
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Important to note here, however, is not only Adrián’s outright rejection of U.S. 
Americans’ characterization of Mexicans as second-class citizens, but his going to 
great lengths to reverse the logic of their prejudice or racism. That is, he goes so far 
as to explicitly make evident that their racism against Mexicans is a result of their 
own inadequacies and defectiveness. Addressing a comment made by Natalia, the 
pediatric surgeon, who shares with the group that she is profoundly upset (“A mí me 
molesta en extremo”) by how Mexicans are treated in the United States, Adrián inter-
rupts her, and looking directly at me, begins:
Why do you judge or mistreat Mexicans when you yourselves have no more than a sixth-
grade education! If you want to correct [a Mexican], okay, fine, but do it the right way. But, 
what moral authority do you have to correct someone else when you yourself don’t even 
know how to read properly?
Adrián’s use of “you” above refers to U.S. Americans more generally, although 
it is clear that he includes me in this category.13 And, his posing of the hypothetical 
question, “Why do you judge or mistreat Mexicans when you yourselves have no 
more than a sixth-grade education?” is clearly meant to underscore what he per-
ceives to be a moral incongruity. To cement this point, and again, to highlight U.S. 
Americans’ own defectiveness, he provides another example in the context of our 
discussion of Mexican skilled migration to the U.S.:14 
Really, do you think that if someone with a Ph.D. goes to the U.S., do you think they’re 
going to get a job? I am not going to go wash dishes in the U.S. It’s a question of dignity. 
At minimum, I can go teach a class. At minimum, I can teach you to read. Or, I can teach 
you math, which, I can assure you, Americans desperately need. 
Further, drawing on his own experience while studying in the U.S. —indeed, 
assuring the group that he witnessed this “with this own eyes”—, Adrián avows 
that math departments at U.S. universities are overrun with foreign faculty, includ-
ing Japanese, Chinese, and Indian professors. Thus, what Adrián insists on getting 
across is that U.S. Americans would not excel or be competitive on the world market 
were it not for “foreign faculty who are busy teaching math to American students.”
13  Throughout the interview, I had the uncomfortable feeling that in strategically using the term you instead 
of Americans, Adrián’s was including me in the category “American” as distinctly (and explicitly) differ-
ent from implicitly including me in the category “Mexican” (presumably because I emigrated from Mexico 
to the U.S. permanently).
14  Again, note Adrián’s use of the word “you” instead of “American” to implicate me as either an immigrant 
“sell-out” or as an ambassador of the U.S., so to speak. 
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Adrián’s assertion that he can, at the very least, teach U.S. Americans to read or 
do math is to turn what he deems to be their racism on its head, and goes to the heart 
of the very humiliation that he himself and other Mexicans have suffered at the 
hands of gringos. Indeed, it is worthwhile questioning how much of the context of 
Mexican identity —that Mexicans are the very best (unos chingones), and that Mexi-
can culture is qualitatively superior (super chingona)— is fashioned by a reversed 
logic and “juxtaposition to the humiliation, deprivation, and oppression suffered 
historically at the hands of the U.S.[providing] a common foundation that strength-
ens the sense of [Mexican] national identity and imbues it with a shared sense of 
distrust toward the U.S.” (Morris, 1999: 371). In the context of Morris’s (1999) obser-
vation then, Natalia’s logic of (im)mobility —specifically, that she has no desire to 
immigrate to the U.S.— must be understood as a means by which she discursively 
and symbolically exacts justice on behalf of her lower-class compatriots and migrants 
who have been mistreated in the U.S. Natalia self-consciously reflects,
I think there’s this history, this cultural history that we Mexicans have with the U.S. I think 
there’s this “recelo,” this particular distrust and suspicion [of the U.S.]. And in fact, I think 
that [Mexican] people with a certain level of education and culture are [less likely to go 
live to the U.S.]. Perhaps I represent that extreme. I go to the U.S. to have fun and to study. 
I go there to vacation. But, I have no desire to live there. It’s this feeling like I want to do 
justice to my compatriots who have experienced racism and prejudice in the U.S.
As Natalia shared her views, Adrián and others in the group nodded their 
heads in support and vocalized their agreement. To paraphrase from what Adrián so 
eloquently shared with the group, the recelo of which Natalia speaks must be under-
stood in the larger context of the history of Mexico/U.S. relations. More specifically, 
in terms of what Mexicans deem to be the United States’ long-standing pretentions 
about intellectual and moral superiority (which Natalia so forcefully sought to de-
bunk when she shared her Mayo Clinic experience), its imposition of political and 
economic domination, its belligerence, and its history and practice of exploitation. 
This is a history, Adrián notes, that goes back to the heyday of U.S. imperialism in 
Mexico, and which, for all intents and purposes, continues today. In his estimation, 
the same “sentiment of natural aversion” Mexicans have toward the Spaniard —the 
colonizer— 15 exists toward the U.S. American. He continues, “So what happens 
15  Adrián has long been employed by Bancomer, a Spanish bank in Mexico. He and his partner, also em-
ployed by Bancomer, share with the rest of the group their resentment of the fact that all the top positions at 
the bank are held by Spaniards, and more generally dislike the fact that so many Spaniards have immigra-
ted to Mexico as a result of the economic recession in Spain. As far as Adrián is concerned, “There is no 
54 
Carmen Henne-OCHOa
nOrteamériCa
then is that we have all this hate reserved…Someone tells you about…the gringos, 
and the Mexican is willing to go to war, so to speak.” Indeed, for Adrián and the 
other Mexican professionals whose narratives are presented here, this “being at” or 
“going to war” with the gringos is part and parcel of their logic of (im)mobility, more 
specifically, of their decision, at least discursively, not to migrate to the United States.
concLusIon 
“Is there any reluctance on the part of Mexican professionals to migrate to the United 
States?” Alarcón (2007: 246) posed this question in an essay on skilled migrants in 
North America, and he himself responded that scant research on the migration of 
skilled Mexicans makes this question difficult to answer. I believe the data I have 
presented here provides some answers, which suggest a more complicated picture 
than extant accounts of the (im)mobility of Mexican professionals. Social network 
theory may provide a robust accounting that explains the significant numbers of 
highly skilled Peruvian migrants to the United States. However, the supposed ab-
sence of social networks for Mexican professionals does little to further our under-
standing of skilled migration from Mexico. On the one hand, it undermines the ways 
in which individuals’ class-based dispositions, cultural beliefs, and social practices 
intimately inform their logic of (im)mobility. And, on the other hand, it ignores the 
socio-historical specificities of U.S./Mexico migration and relations. Indeed, Mexi-
can professionals’ deeply held beliefs about the United States’ belligerence, its impo-
sition of political and economic domination, and its history and practice of 
exploitation intimately inform their “staying-put” decision-making processes. A so-
ciocultural framework, then, one that is particularly attuned to individuals’ own 
discursive renderings, is important if we are to understand how decisions to migrate 
and not to migrate are framed and reframed, indeed, are rooted, in migrants’ and 
non-migrants’ own meaning-making and experiences. The data presented here un-
derscores the importance of and the need for ethnographic research on the phenom-
enology of skilled migration from Mexico.
doubt that they [Spaniards] took a lot of our wealth, a lot of gold, and a lot of silver. And today, many 
Spanish families continue to come to Mexico [to take away the wealth].”
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APPendIx-oPen-ended IntervIew guIde
Note: Below is a sample of questions I asked during interviews. Questions below 
were posed in no particular order, and asked only when relevant. What appears in 
parentheses is my translation. 
seccIón 5: ActItudes generALes sobre emIgrAcIón y LA socIedAd estAdounIdense 
(Section 5: General Attitudes Regarding Emigration and U.S. American Society)
¿Qué me puede decir usted sobre la situación de empleo o de desempleo en la Ciudad 
de México?
(What can you tell me about [un]employment in Mexico City?) 
¿Cómo han manejado los profesionistas el desempleo? 
(How have Mexican professionals handled unemployment?)
¿Ha estado usted desempleado/o (por razones que no fueron de su propia voluntad)? 
(Have you ever been unemployed [for reasons that were not of your own volition]?)
¿Cómo ha manejado el desempleo/subempleo?
(How have you handled being unemployed/underemployed?)
¿Alguna vez ha vivido fuera de México?, ¿cuándo?, ¿por qué motivo?
(Have you ever lived outside Mexico? When? Why?) 
¿Alguna vez ha considerado emigrar [fuera de México]?, ¿adónde?
(Have you ever considered emigrating to a place outside of Mexico? Where?)
¿Bajo qué circunstancias emigraría? 
(Under what circumstances would you emigrate?)
Si usted emigrara, ¿se iría solo/a o con su familia?
(If you emigrated, would you go alone or with your family?) 
En orden de preferencia, a qué países emigraría? Explique su respuesta. 
(In order of preference, what countries would you /be willing to emigrate to? Explain your 
answer.)
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¿Alguna vez consideraría emigrar sin los documentos requeridos? Es decir, ¿emigraría 
ilegalmente (como indocumentado/a)?
(Would you ever consider emigrating without the required documents? In other words, 
would you consider emigrating irregularly?)
¿Tiene familia en Estado Unidos?, ¿por qué se fueron?, ¿cómo les ha ido a sus 
familiares en Estados Unidos?
(Do you have family in the United States? Why did they leave [Mexico]? How has your 
family fared in the United States?) 
¿Cuándo fue la última vez que estuvo en contacto con ellos (sus familiares en 
Estados Unidos)?
(When was the last time you were in contact with your family residing in the United 
States?) 
Si tuviera alguna necesidad, ¿se sentiría cómodo/a en pedirles ayuda de algún tipo 
[a sus familiares en Estados Unidos]?
(If you were in any kind of need, would you feel comfortable asking your family who 
resides in the U.S. for help of any kind?) 
¿Qué opina sobre la sociedad estadunidense?, ¿sobre los estadunidenses?
(What is your opinion of the United States? About U.S. Americans?)
En qué aspectos más importantes piensa que Estados Unidos y México son diferentes 
(similares)? ¿Piensa que las dos sociedades tienen valores y principios similares o 
diferentes? 
(In what important aspects do you think the United States and Mexico differ? How are they 
similar? Do you think that the two societies have similar/different values and principles?) 
¿Qué opina sobre la relación política, económica, cultural o social entre México y 
Estados Unidos?
(What is your opinion of the relationship —whether political, economic, cultural and/or 
social— between Mexico and the United States?) 
¿Qué opina sobre cómo se trata a los migrantes mexicanos en Estados Unidos?
(What is your opinion of how Mexican migrants are treated in the U.S.?)
62 
Carmen Henne-OCHOa
nOrteamériCa
Imagine que tuviera que emigrar a Estados Unidos, ¿qué tan diferente sería su vida 
(cotidiana y a largo plazo) en comparación con cómo vive hoy en México?
(Imagine you had to migrate to the United States. Compared to how you live your life 
currently in Mexico, how different, and in which ways, do you think your life would be 
day-to-day and long-term in the United States?)     
